above: Sheri Berman's 'The Primacy of Politics'
The following is an engagement with Sheri Berman's book on European Social Democracy and what she calls 'democratic revisionism'. The question of relative independance of the political sphere from the economic base is considered in depth; including the 'mututal conditioning of structure and agency upon each other'. There are implications for Australia as well: notably the potential for progressive parties to mobilise against the 'veto' of capitalists on public policy. But at the same time - even while acknowledging the potential of democratic socialism, the reviewer (Tristan Ewins) argues that the power of this 'veto' should not be understated.
Tristan Ewins
Jan 3rd 2013
In her work “The Primacy of Politics”, political scientist
Sheri Berman compares what she refers to as “orthodox Marxism” with “democratic
revisionism”, starting with Eduard Bernstein, but ultimately finding expression
with Western social democracy. Swedish
social democracy is seen to have been the most successful instance; enjoying a
hegemonic period spanning decades and a legacy that remains vital today.
Berman’s book deals with a number of opposing and mediating
themes.
Marxian
historical materialist determinism (with its
alleged implication of political and economic ‘passivity’) is contrasted with
what Berman sees as an economically activist and politically voluntarist
disposition on the part of ‘democratic revisionism’.
Radical and revolutionary negation emerging
from the logic and spirit of class struggle – and based on the interwar
“Marxist orthodoxy” -
is opposed to
reformist agendas based on class collaboration and conciliation.
Working class internationalism is contrasted
against the promotion of ‘national community’ and ‘national solidarity’.
Swedish social democracy in particular is praised for making that ground – of
national community and solidarity – their own – effectively denying it as a
rallying point for the Swedish far right.
Here, ‘orthodox Marxism’ is held by Berman to be consistent
with the perspectives of those such as Kautksy, Rudolf Hilferding, Otto Bauer
and other Social Democratic politicians during the interwar period. (for
instance, Leon Blum)
Emerging with
Kautsky’s popularisation of Marxism in the late 19
th century, this
perspective remained influential for many European social democratic parties
through the immediate post-WWII period.
Again: according to Berman, the ‘orthodox Marxist’ viewpoint
was marked by belief in class struggle; a fatalistic and passively-inclined
materialist and economistic determinism; and hence the downplaying of the
potential for political action to shape economic outcomes.
Hence Berman notes how Leon Blum in
particular distinguished between “the ‘exercise’ and the ‘conquest’ of power”;
(Berman; Pp 100- 101)
Apparently this is
meant to be another example of orthodox Marxian ‘passivity’.
And we have observed in earlier chapters how
there is at times some substance to this charge – eg: in the Kautskyan notion
of social democrats being history’s ‘midwives’ rather than history’s
makers.
(ie:
revolutionary; but not
revolution-making)
And yet perhaps Blum’s distinction is useful after all. Berman pretty much rules out widespread
economic socialisation – depicting it as ideological and of little practical
value. But perhaps the reality, here, is
self-containment on the basis of a presumed effective ‘capitalist veto’ on the
economic policies of social democratic governments.
Hence there is more to the ‘conquest of power’ that an
electoral majority.
There remains the challenge
of overcoming resistance to democracy embedded in the state apparatus of force;
of the cultural “fortresses and casemates” spoke of by Gramsci; and the power
of global capital – with the threat of capital strike, economic destabilisation
etc.
In modern capitalist liberal
democracy there has even developed a kind of “double-think” – an Ideology of
democracy existing alongside open recognition of the effective ‘veto of
capital’.
(although the Nordics certainly
show that even in this context there is room to move if labour organisation is
strong enough)
By comparison with the ‘orthodoxy’, however, Berman posits a
specific and unique social democratic ideology – what she calls “democratic
revisionism” – based on economic and political activism: rooted in “the primacy
of the political”.
For Berman modern
social democracy is synonymous with this “democratic revisionism”, and not with
the Marxist orthodoxy which was ultimately outflanked on both sides – by
revisionism on the Right and radically voluntaristic Bolshevism on the Left.
For Berman the Marxist orthodoxy failed at the crucial
moment; that is, the interwar period, including the Depression and the rise of
fascism.
Berman depicts ostensibly
Marxist Socialist parties – in the tradition of the pre-WWI International -
resigned to the inevitable ‘working through’ of capitalist contradictions to
the point of revolution; as opposed to a struggle to significantly ameliorate human
suffering within the framework of capitalism itself.
Berman provides a host of examples to illustrate her point,
but here we will mainly concern ourselves further with the
experience of Swedish social democracy in the inter-war and immediate post-war
period.
Berman depicts Socialist parties – in the interwar and
immediate post-war period – as imposing upon themselves an “ideological purity”
for which practical action for the sake of their constituencies were
forsaken.
In defence of those ‘orthodox’
elements, however,
it is worth noting
that it was in their efforts to avoid opportunism, and hence the
disillusionment of their working class base,
that social democratic parties in the ‘orthodox’ tradition tended to
avoid cross-class collaboration and compromise. Especially, for this reason
they avoided taking part in coalition governments with bourgeois parties. This
practical consideration was at least as powerful as any yearning for
“ideological purity” – and critiques of Marxist social democracy need to allow
for such motives.
Yet it is true that in his time Kautsky himself adopted a
quasi-“mechanistic” Marxism which, while recognising “willing” human beings
(but not ‘free will’), nonetheless discerned a nexus between universal suffrage
and the rise to dominance of the industrial working class. Indeed, this was a
nexus which – it was assumed – rendered socialism inevitable – assuming the
prerequisite of a democratic political revolution. Yet Kautsky’s very emphasis on the necessity
of political revolution dispels
Berman’s (any many others’) effective accusation of bland and undiluted economism, even though the
‘orthodox’ did suppose the primacy of the economy ‘in the last instance’.
And yet in the crucial interwar period Berman has a point
that economistic fatalism could only play into the hands of the fascist
enemy.
Where liberals and socialists
ought have compromised with practical economic action in the face of
Depression, ‘political stalemate’ saw desperate and bitter Germans turn instead
to so-called ‘National Socialism’. As Berman argues, in Germany and Italy it
was fascism that took up the mantle of economic activism, as well as
‘class-transcending’ and collectivist visions and rhetoric of national
community.
But by contrast when Swedish
Social Democrats took the ground of “national community”, cross class
solidarity and economic activism, it was they and not the fascists who emerged
triumphant.
As we will see, Berman appreciates the role of Ernst
Wigforss – the Swedish politician, self-taught economist and political
scientist, in ‘anticipating Keynesianism before Keynes.’
Berman further looks to Wladimir S Woytinsky
and the German unions during interwar/Depression period – who also
independently (ie: before Keynes) came up with a plan to stimulate the German
economy; creating “socially useful” work with “competitive wages”.
Berman contrasts Woytinsky’s plan for
“deficit financing” and economic stimulus with the “full-fledged ‘socialist’
strategy adopted by the SPD Left – in the form of a plan devised by the
Austro-Marxist Rudolf Hilferding.
(Berman, p 112)
As Berman observes; Hilferding’s plan rested on moves
towards economic planning and socialisation; including “nationalisation of
banks, insurance…, key industries, [with] state control of monopolies, the
expropriation of large estates; a shortened work-week; work sharing; and a
limited work-creation program financed through increased taxes and a forced
loan.” (Berman; p 112)
But for Berman apparently Hilderding’s approach comprised an
example of the ‘orthodox viewpoint’ of class struggle and economic
socialisation – a vision which failed to address peoples fears or “stir their
imagination”.
(Berman, pp 114-115)
Yet Berman’s characterisation could just as well be turned
in the other direction: that the non-socialist parties would not compromise and
actually deal with the Depression in a rational and necessarily socialist
manner. The visions of Wigforss and
Woytinsky, here, resonate with our relatively vivid historic political memory
of the social-democratic Keynesian ‘golden age’. But the democratic socialism of Hilferding
was never given a chance. We will never
know, now, what its outcome in Germany would have been.
Despite this, however, Berman tellingly observes an
“orthodox” Marxian social democratic mainstream ‘caught off guard’ in Germany
by the rise of fascism in response to the Depression. Crisis they had
anticipated: but fascism they had not anticipated. As expected, class struggle
intensified with the Depression.
But the
lure of Nazism proved more powerful than the appeal of both the SPD and of the
Communists; and in 1933 the Nazi vote had risen to almost 44 per cent.
( Pp 109-111)
and see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_federal_election,_March_1933
Either Hilferding’s approach or Woytinsky’s approach may
have significantly ameliorated the life experiences of impoverished and fearful
Germans. But Berman effectively argues that it was Hitler’s playing upon
humiliation, bitterness and desperation in the context of an appeal to national
community, ‘belonging’ and solidarity that proved decisive.
The lesson suggested by Berman is as with the title of her
book: “the primacy of politics”; of the power of the political imagination; of
political mobilisation, strategy and action – as compared with what she calls
‘fatalistic doctrines’. (ie: specifically, the Marxist “orthodoxy”)
Hence the difference between Germany’s turn
to fascism and Sweden’s turn to social democracy was to a significant degree a
matter of subjective Swedish social democratic
strategy and tactics.
Berman is a voluntarist: but a democratic one – unwilling to
embrace what Steger has referred to as “the extremes ends and means
calculations” embraced by the Bolsheviks.
And yet Berman’s voluntarism is not unqualified.
As she concedes towards the end of ‘The
Primacy of Politics”:
“Those who study Ideology tend to
focus on either agency or structure.”
Yet in reality
“structure and agency work
together to shape the development of ideologies….” (Berman: pp 201-203)
As individuals we have free will: including the potential to
come together collectively; to organise politically to reshape national economies
– and ultimately the global economy. Indeed, this was the hope of Marxist
Social Democracy, and of Berman’s
‘distinct’ and ‘political’ Social Democracy. (ie: of post-war Western European
and Nordic Social Democracy) But this is
no mean feat. Capitalism as a
supra-individual, supra-national phenomena develops its own logic – much of which was identified by
the Marxists who Berman rejects.
Structure and agency condition
each other.
Again we return to the arch-revisionist Bernstein who Berman
herself sees as the originator of “democratic revisionism.” Hence we reproduce this crucial quote from
Bernstein again:
“The fall of the profit rate is a
fact, the advent of over-production and crises is a fact, periodic diminution
of capital is a fact, the concentration and centralisation of industrial
capital is a fact, the increase of the rate of surplus value is a fact.” (Bernstein, Pp 41-42)
These phenomena – observed by Bernstein – remain in the logic of capitalism and
the processes of its ongoing systemic reproduction. Social Democratic
counter-cyclical demand management helps ‘iron out’ the business cycle; and
where they remain robust welfare states protect the vulnerable from the ravages
of capitalism in the context of relative abundance even amidst great
waste. And yet capitalism remains
wasteful, unstable, undemocratic and unjust.
Berman observes of modern social democracy: that it started
with Bernstein and other like-minds - who claimed to revise Marxism – but
ultimately “Social Democracy represented the
final and full severing of socialism from Marxism.” (my emphasis) (Berman, P 200)
This ‘severing’ is presented as some great victory; some
triumph; a “liberation”(!)
But perhaps
the rejection of Marxism has become just
too fashionable.
There
is an
objective need for a distinctive social democratic ideology. Distinct, that is,
from revolutionary Marxism; occupying the relative ‘Centre-Left’ – of
well-intentioned social reformers; armed with what Berman called a “democratic
revisionist” critique of capitalism; of those willing and able to reform
capitalism and ameliorate the suffering of the oppressed in the here and
now.
And contra Berman’s apparent
dismissal of the strategy of socialisation, historic social democratic mixed
economies provide an object lesson in how a ‘hybrid economy’ can meaningfully
aspire to – and to some degree achieve – ‘the best of both worlds’.
Also a more radical and modern variant on this theme this
could potentially provide the benefits of a mix of co-operation and planning;
of competition and ‘free markets’; including the role of natural monopolies and
the place of a democratic mixed economy in righting market failure (including
the current European Depression and European/American debt crisis),
alleviating alienation and injecting
democracy into otherwise plutocratic economic regimes. Crucially, there is a
need to break out of a neo-liberal capitalist paradigm for which systemic
imperatives of growth and profit-maximisation have been decoupled from
questions of the ‘Life-world’ (Habermas)
Hence, for instance, the capitalist drive to raise retirement ages even
in the midst of relative abundance.
And yet mainstream Social Democracy has widely become
so technocratic and opportunistic that it
can no longer inspire or mobilise.
There
is talk of a ‘Centre-Left’:
but what does
that mean today?
There are appeals
to class reconciliation – yet while this
can
provide a powerful rationale for a universalistic welfare state (eg: Sweden) so
often this is but a veil behind which follows the disenfranchisement of workers
and the oppressed.
In the past (For instance in Australia with the ‘Accord’
process) there has been a kind of corporatism – which originally had potential,
but ultimately included the organised working class only during its period of
decline; containing and co-opting it during the crucial period of neo-liberal
transformation . There is deregulation of labour markets in the sense of
protections: but intensification of regulation in the sense of denying
industrial liberties and rights.
The
welfare state and progressive and corporate taxation are wound back and the
vulnerable stigmatised and vilified. All these can be construed as a kind of
‘corporate welfare’ - assisting in the process of intensifying the rate and
intensity of exploitation to restore profits.
And again these developments are consistent structural imperatives in
capitalism – enforced globally with the complicity of the great existing and
emerging world powers.
In response to these developments it must be observed,
therefore, that there remain criticisms of capitalism arising from the Marxist
tradition - suggested by Bernstein himself many decades ago – which remain as
accurate as ever – but which are widely considered ‘unspeakable’ because of the
power of dominant Ideologies and their sweeping dismissal of that Marxist
tradition in all its great diversity.
Berman is right that structure and agency interpenetrate
however.
A social democracy which
borrows from Marxism in both its moral and structural critique of capitalism;
but which maintains a voluntarist sense of the potential for political strategy
and political will – is also necessary today.
Indeed – the political and economic demands of the modern day require a
plurality of social democracies; and in
this vision there remains a place for the insights of the broad Marxist
tradition as well as distinct positions on today’s strategic and relative
‘Centre-Left’.
Certainly ‘Marxism’ does
not hold
all the answers – let alone
the “revolutionary Centrism” of about a century ago.
But the Marxist tradition in all its great
plurality deserves a rigorous and critical reassessment – discerning those
insights which hold weight today despite the verdict of the dominant Ideologies.
Rehabilitating the outlook of class struggle is one
crucial imperative.
And all the more so because
overwhelmingly the corporate world embraces the neo-liberal Ideology; and is
not interested in robust social democratic corporatism. And so the poor and the
working class can only depend on that which they strive for through their own
efforts – through industrial and civic organisation and activism.
The prospect of civic peace and
reconciliation is alluring and powerful: but given the logic of capitalism; and
the interests and Ideology of the capitalist class – it is often chimerical.
Because structure and agency interpenetrate and co-determine
each other, the old Marxist Orthodoxy has its limits; and the potential of
so-called ‘political socialism’ or ‘democratic revisionism’ needs to be taken
into account. And yet despite the potential of these trends considered by
Berman, she does not sufficiently consider the implications of the effective ‘veto’
exercised by monopoly capital.
She
supposes a rigorous voluntarism, and ‘manyfold possibilities’ for reformist social
democracy.
But she does not tackle the
question of how the ‘capitalist veto’ on policy is to be overcome.
But that is the question we MUST address if
we are to establish a genuine democracy in the place of default ‘dictatorship
of capital.’
Bibliography
Berman,
Sheri, ‘The Primacy of Politics – Social Democracy and
the Making of Europe’s Twentieth Century’,
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