An Australian Response to Tony Blair: ‘Convergence Politics is not the Answer’

above:  Tony Blair urges Bill Shorten to 'return to the centre'

By Tristan Ewins

The ‘Weekend Australian’ (8/10/16) quotes former Labour British PM, Tony Blair as urging Bill Shorten to tack “back to the centre”. Typically, Blair holds that the occupation of ‘the centre ground’ is crucial to building a significant-enough constituency to carry an electoral majority. And that regardless of this ‘it is the right thing to do’. Furthermore, Blair contends that Australian Labor must not only “talk to its core constituency”. (ie: we might reasonably assume he means ‘the traditional working class’).

Blair also warns of the danger of unions becoming a small ‘c’ conservative force: mainly fixated on the public sector, and unable of grappling with the nature of today’s private sector – where unions have long been in decline.

Finally, Blair makes the usual assertion that parties of the ‘centre-left’ must be about ‘growing the [economic] pie’ – with the implication that ‘dividing the cake more fairly’ runs contrary to this.

British Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn is dismissed as ‘ultra-left’, with Blair raising his head as the champion of the globalist, cosmopolitan ‘third way’ ‘social democracy’ popularised by Giddens and others. Importantly: ‘globalisation’ is not some single, homogenous phenomena. There are desirable aspects of ‘globalisation’ as well. Though specifically, here, we are concerned with its neo-liberal guise; including how that applies to world investment and trade.

To briefly engage with some of Blair’s contentions before moving on:



There is truth in the observation that organised labour must ‘return to the private sector’. Indeed a strong foothold in the public sector could provide a base from which solidarity could be extended to less-secure private sector workers in the midst of industrial upheavals. Furthermore, Labor’s legacy of labour market deregulation must be reconsidered ‘at the lower end’ – with the aim of ending the exploitation of various workers in areas as diverse as child care, aged care, cleaning, retail, hospitality and so on.

Labor’s ‘natural constituency’ – the broader working class – is still very much in the majority (if one focuses on the social relation of wage labour, as opposed to peoples’ ‘self-identity’). Labor’s difficulty is not the dissolution of the working class: but the development within it of various conflicts and contradictions. Including conflicts of ‘consciousness’ and ‘identity’.

For example: there are residual delusions on the part of some white collar workers that they comprise ‘the middle class’ ; which are reinforced by social democratic reluctance to actually speak of ‘the working class’ – and elucidate what that really means today. Also: there is the supposition that ‘Labor’s base’ can be taken for granted – and that it’s ‘the swinging middle’ that really counts.

Class loyalties do not necessarily shift straight away – but over generations. Surely the United States shows the consequences where the US Democrats have long spoke only of ‘the middle class’, and could not bring themselves to prioritise discussion of ‘the working class’. They did not deliver workers from the ravages of deindustrialisation and ‘the neo-liberal version of globalisation’. And demagogues such as Trump have filled the vacuum. Trump does not represent workers’ interests; and this could be made apparent if only the Democrats would rise to the occasion. Similarly, Labor must overcome and heal the internal divisions within the Australian working class to promote a social democracy which appeals to the interests of the majority of voters.

Also admittedly: Unions are not ‘essentially progressive’ even if their class location positions them to effectively promote the interests of the majority of the labouring masses (as against a minority bourgeoisie). German unions, for instance, were central to mobilising the war-effort in Germany in 1914 ; and beforehand had turned against more radical elements who had traditionally led the Social Democrats, and who would come to oppose that conflict. That war decimated German social democracy, and also the German working class.

Revisionist socialist scholar and parliamentarian Eduard Bernstein also warned that specific unions had the potential to become ‘corporate interests’ who furthered their own dominance of particular markets and industries without prioritising the position of the broader working class and labour movement, and others amongst the disenfranchised and oppressed.

In Australia, meanwhile, (with a much different phenomenon) some right-wing unions have promoted agendas of privatisation and economic neo-liberalism; and some (such as the right-wing ‘Shop, Distributive and Allied’ union – or ‘SDA’) have at times abandoned their own members’ interests in order to secure industry coverage (and hence political power within the Labor Party) due to collusion with employers. Sometimes unions are seen as vehicles for political power and political careers, as opposed to being primarily vehicles for workers’ interests, and social democracy.

That said: these instances should not be taken as ‘typical’ of the Australian labour movement. Despite legitimate misgivings about The Accord years and their aftermath, for example, Australian unions waged a vigorous campaign against the Howard Government’s regressive ‘Workchoices’ industrial legislation. They are still capable of representing and mobilising their members, and of waging successful campaigns.

With regard the old shibboleth that neo-liberal economic policies are required to ‘grow the pie’: something ‘traditional social democracy (supposedly) is not positioned to do’ , we might make another series of observations. The Nordics have demonstrated that it is possible to build a robust public sector and welfare state; with saturation levels of unionisation ; and a culture of solidarity. In the ‘golden age’ of the Swedish ‘Rehn-Meidner’ economic model, this combined effective full employment with low inflation, and the extension of welfare and social services. If not for a series of tactical errors, economic democracy might also have been entrenched through the ‘Meidner wage earner funds’ initiative during the 1970s and 1980s.

In fact, today it is ‘the systemic imperatives of capitalism’ and capitalist Ideology that stand in the way of fulfilling the personal and social needs of humanity. Amidst greater abundance than has been known ever before in human history, we are informed repeatedly that we must ‘tighten our belts’. Welfare and social services are progressively cut. Education is for ‘industry needs’ and not ‘the development of human potential’. And of course ‘the user must pay’ (though this is taken to mean students; and not the corporations who benefit from the various skills and aptitudes which are developed). Improved life expectancy is seen as a ‘curse’ rather than a ‘blessing’. So the retirement age is pushed upwards incrementally. The elderly are made to feel they are ‘a burden’ , and working class people are expected to exhaust their assets and savings to pay for ‘aged care’ which denies them dignity, comfort or happiness.

Alongside an increased age of retirement, the intensity of labour increases. Capitalism demands growth into new markets to preserve its own stability; but with ‘globalisation’ (just for now interpreted as the expansion of international trade; though it has other interpretations) reaching its limits, markets for consumption depend on increasing the sheer volume of labour (and hence purchasing power). Though casualisation shows it does not always work out that way (‘capital mobility’ is another aspect of globalisation; as is the rise of a ‘global culture’ that emerges via improvements in communications technology; Marx himself had observed the emergence of a ‘world literature’ as early as the 19th Century).

Where technology does not improve productivity, instead productivity is tied to that intensity of labour. In Australia today improvement of wages and conditions are largely ruled out without such productivity improvements. Hence for a great many wages and conditions stagnate or are rolled back. Organised labour is vilified. The working poor are even played off against the vulnerable welfare-dependent with ‘the politics of downward envy’. In response the Left must promote a politics of respect and solidarity.

A move back towards a social democratic mixed economy could stabilise national economies and the world economy over the short to medium term as a consequence of superior cost structures. But this is eschewed for reasons of Ideology, power, and private greed. Instead trade agreements are deployed to break down any ‘barriers’ preventing the fullest possible exploitation of potential markets by multinational corporations. ‘Natural public monopolies’ could stand to be criminalised (ie: sovereign governments could be sued); as well perhaps as ‘market distorting’ initiatives which may promote economic democracy (for example, any scheme providing assistance to co-operative enterprise of various sorts). Amidst all this ; and even after the cataclysm of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis – Tony Blair and ‘The Australian’ are still trying to sell us ‘neo-liberalism with a human face’.

From the outset it is also worth observing that historical traditions other than ‘modern third way social democracy’ have also claimed the ‘centrist ground’ (for instance Catholic ‘social Centrism’ in Germany, and the Swedish ‘Centre Party’). Defining ‘the centre’ is fraught with possible confusion. As opposed to a linear ‘left-right spectrum’ a ‘political compass’ accommodates both economic egalitarianism AND personal and collective liberties. But Blair is employing a more ‘traditional’ left-right spectrum.

Hence Blair’s ‘centrism’ is confusing: sometimes comprising a mish-mash of liberal and authoritarian positions. Hawkish foreign policy; rejection of class struggle; embrace of economic and cultural globalisation; according to some interpretations implementation of ‘punitive welfare’ and labour conscription; and effective rejection of a traditional mixed economy in favour of privatisation and what we have come to know as ‘neo-liberalism’.

Also importantly: ‘the Centre’ is always RELATIVE. A political party which makes a habit of ‘passively occupying’ ‘the middle ground’ rather than striving to RE-DEFINE and shift it resigns itself to a passive or even reactive response to social issues and conflicts.

Under Hawke and Keating – who Blair praises profusely – Australia moved decisively to the Right on many fronts– embracing small government, privatisation, deregulation, dilution of progressive taxation, rejection of class struggle; widespread deindustrialisation ; and so on. Whereas Blair followed Hawke and Keating, Australian Labor in turn followed Blair. The consequence was a ‘rightward-spiral’ which was the undoing of social democracy and labourism as we had known them.

In a further article in ‘The Australian’ by Troy Bramston (8/10), poet, W.B.Yeats’s ‘The Second Coming’ is taken very much out-of-context. The title proclaims “Things Fall Apart – The Centre Can’t Hold’. Bramston is very much with Blair, fearing the decline of the ‘centre-left’ as a consequence of a more unambiguous left-turn by Corbyn. Corbyn (and perhaps by implication, Shorten) are portrayed as wanting ‘a return to the past’ rather than ‘progressing forward’. Ironically this implies the in-some- ways similar notion of a ‘progressive teleology’ as proposed by Hegel and Marx; and more recently by Fukuyama. ‘Neo-liberalism’ is upheld as ‘the progressive and objective direction of history’: in a way which denies historic choice; and the meaningful contestation of history by social actors.

The problem with Blair is that his position is very much one of ‘convergence politics’. ‘Convergence on the centre’ actually dissolves genuine ‘centre-left’ politics as we once knew them. Whereas democratic socialists once claimed ‘the centre left ground’ – roughly halfway between liberal centrism and the unambiguously revolutionary Left traditions; today ‘convergence on the centre’ is the undoing of meaningful democracy. It is the undoing of meaningful choice.

As French social theorist Chantal Mouffe has insisted ‘convergence politics’ ‘empties out’ democracy by denying real choice and democratically-mediated conflict as a consequence of ‘a rush to the Centre’. It is worth briefly considering her position – and that of critical theorist, Jurgen Habermas – to critique the ‘Blair-ite Third Way’ from different perspectives.

Whereas Habermas supposed a ‘deliberative democracy’, with the pursuit of a ‘perfect speech situation’ – or ‘communicative rationality’, Mouffe does not believe rational exchange and engagement can resolve all differences and conflicts. Still strongly-influenced by Marx, though, Habermas continues to suppose a ‘historical telos’; which will be realised through ‘communicative action’ (ie: rational engagement, argument and deliberation by social actors). Importantly, as opposed to Blair, Giddens, etc, Habermas was optimistic enough to suppose that this process would ultimately lead to socialism (realised via communicative rationality and not only through ‘traditional’ class struggle; hence some divergence from Marx’s original position).

Both Habermas and Mouffe are radical Leftist democrats, however; and BOTH Habermas’s ‘communicative action’ and Mouffe’s ‘Agonism’ reject ‘centrist convergence’. What is notable with Mouffe’s position is essentially that history is not assumed as ‘having a fixed direction’ (or ‘telos’). And as opposed to traditional Marxism, neither are particular social actors (such as the working class) assumed to have any ‘essential and fixed historic mission’. For Mouffe history is contested by social actors who articulate ‘counter-hegemonic strategies’. History is not pre-determined but rests on our CHOICES. Though Mouffe does accept that despite this capitalism has systemic imperatives and ‘logics’ that no isolated individual can challenge.

Here ‘meaningful choice’ – central to democracy – must mean a robust pluralism. But as opposed to older notions of class struggle, Mouffe’s ‘post-Marxism’ insists that:

“within the ‘we’ that constitutes the political community, the opponent is not considered an enemy to be destroyed but an adversary whose existence is legitimate.”

And most preferably these assumptions must cut both ways! (though it will not always be the case) Importantly, Marx argued for the dissolution of the bourgeoisie as a class; that is the dissolution of particular social relations – as opposed to the wholesale murder of human beings as occurred under Stalinism. But Mouffe insists an ongoing and legitimate place for pluralism, and hence appears to reject Marx’s notion of communism as ‘an end destination’ (or to put it in Marx’s own words, ‘the end of pre-history’).

So Mouffe assumes mediated conflict as being central to meaningful democracy. And the silencing of dissident voices by ‘third way, cosmopolitan, neo-liberal globalism’ could perhaps even lead to a technocracy – governance by ‘experts’ – and rejection of the proper place of democratic conflict.

Effectively siding with Blair, ‘The Australian’ has predictably embraced ‘neo-liberal globalism’.

Shorten has ‘been taken to task’ for a very modest step back towards traditional social democracy and labourism. Under Shorten there has been talk of enforcing corporate taxation and effectively tackling ‘corporate welfare’. There is talk of holding the banks accountable. ‘Small government’ is no longer explicitly endorsed (though neither is ‘big government’). “Trickle-down” is rejected.  In the ranks of Labor there is some talk of tackling obscene superannuation concessions which feather the nests of the unambiguously wealthy (to the tune of tens of billions annually) at the same time as vulnerable pensioners are vilified by the Conservatives for the sake of ‘budget repair’. But Shorten still insists on ‘budget repair that is fair’.

None of this is particularly radical! But as the Anglosphere and parts of Europe continue to turn Left in the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis the voices of Conservatism and neo-liberalism have become more shrill. Modest reversions to ‘traditional social democracy’ are ‘fought tooth and nail’ as they ‘set a bad example’ which may provide a ‘turning point’ away from neo-liberalism, and the prioritisation of corporate interests in economics and trade policy. Bernie Sanders has seen the rise of a distinctly Left politics ‘into the US mainstream’. Accused of ‘ultra-Leftism’, in fact British Labour Opposition Leader, Jeremy Corbyn is also reverting to more-traditional Labour perspectives on the mixed economy, rights of labour; affordable education; and support for progressive tax; with a commitment to the NHS (National Health Service); as well as a rejection of ‘Hawkish’ foreign policy. This ought not be seen as ‘going backwards’ – because (contra-Marx) there is no objective definition of what ‘progressing forward’ actually means anyway.

With his warnings of ‘impending doom’ for British Labour – as well as the need for a ‘policy correction’ by Shorten in Australia, Blair does not seem to perceive the shift Leftwards in parts of Europe, and even the ‘Anglosphere’ itself. Ironically it is Blair who is ‘looking backwards’: to the 1990s – when ‘the historical moment was his’. Similarly ‘The Australian’ looks back to the ‘reform era’ where Hawke and Keating to a significant degree liquidated much of what had before-hand passed as labourism, social democracy and democratic socialism in this country. That’s not to say ‘Third Way’ theorists cannot strategise such as to set the agenda once more. But such success in the past is no guarantee of success today or in the future.

So history does not stand still. Over a quarter of a century after the fall of the Soviet Union neo-liberal triumphalism is beginning to wear thin. The Stalinist nightmare is fading from living memory; and the Democratic Left is finally re-emerging from behind its long shadow. Bernie Sanders has brought the American democratic socialist Left ‘into the mainstream’. McCarthy-ist hysteria is largely in the past. And despite defeats, parties like Syriza and Podemos have heralded the return of the Democratic Left after years utterly eclipsed by a ‘Third Way consensus’ in European social democracy.

Again: Amidst all this Shorten’s tentative shift to the Left is very modest. And hand-wringing by Blair and ‘The Australian’ that Shorten Labor must ‘return to the Centre’ clearly demonstrates how narrow a political milieu certain interests, as well as ‘the media establishment’ would have us choose from. ‘Convergence on the Centre’ denies politics; denies pluralist, democratically mediated conflict; and denies real democratic choice.

Nonetheless; Mouffe’s ‘Agonism’ suggests the possibility of a new pluralist democracy – where the democratic Left and the democratic Right accept each others’ ‘right to exist’ – and indeed their ‘legitimacy’ in the sense that voters and citizens must always be posed with real choices in order for democracy to flourish. And that certain liberties are necessary to overcome alienation; and socialists perhaps should even think of their adversaries here.

Perhaps therefore the Left could accept a place for Conservatism in a pluralist democracy; and on the basis of an inclusive public sphere; a more ‘level playing field of ideas’. But in Australia the monopoly mass media is dominated by figures such as Murdoch and Rinehart. The monopolists think they are in control and beyond effective challenge. Hence they do not discern any compelling pressures to accept a more inclusive public sphere; or say ‘active-critical’ civics and citizenship education curricula which also promote ideological and political literacy, and hence informed and participatory citizenship. Some would argue when the opportunity comes the advantage must be pressed. And so long as the Conservatives are not willing to accept the democratic and authentically pluralist principles promoted by the likes of Chantal Mouffe – then perhaps they have a point.

Also ‘social rights are human rights’. No less essential than civil liberties. And ideally should be constitutionally enshrined. Even though these matters should nonetheless be deliberated upon freely. There is the challenge of balancing the aim of ‘pluralism’ and hence ‘openness to change’, while striving for a ‘baseline consensus’ of liberal and social rights which is acceptable to the various social actors. Habermas believed this (and ultimately socialism itself) could be achieved via ‘communicative action’.

In many parts of the world ‘the tide is beginning to turn’. PERHAPS once again the future belongs to radical social democracy.

Socialism as Regulation: Is it Enough? A Response to Adam Ford

 

 

Above: An image of Nils Karleby:  Adam Ford's account of 'Socialism as Regulation' has some things in common with the thinking of this important Swedish Social Democrat

Dr Tristan Ewins

 

Veteran Australian Labor Party activist and blogger Adam Ford has put forward a critique of socialist metanarratives insofar as they retain a commitment to what I would personally define as a ‘democratic mixed economy’.  Specifically, by this I infer a mixed economy including a very robust public sector, but also a broader ‘democratic sector’ including various co-operative models, as well as co-determination, democratic collective capital mobilisation and so on.   Partly in response to my own consideration of the substance of modern socialism, instead Adam Ford proposes a reformed socialist project; one which breaks away from prior emphases on Marx, and prior emphases on public ownership.  Ford reserves the right to define socialism however he chooses, and not necessarily follow in the footsteps of Marx, or anyone else really.  Though in a Bernsteinian fashion (ie: after Eduard Bernstein)  he argues that socialism is a premise from which we depart rather than an ‘end destination’.  

Specifically at his blog 'The Bloodied Wombat' he argues:

“The light on the hill is as a beacon, not a point of arrival. It guides us forward, rather than telling us where to stop.”  

So in its emerging incarnation Adam sees the concrete form of modern socialism as comprising the quite vigorous and indeed aggressive regulation of capitalism.   Though he is not very specific in detailing what form this regulation would take.  Nonetheless, perhaps he has something in common with the Swedish theorist Nils Karleby  - who saw regulation like a peeling away of an onion – where the prerogatives of capital were progressively removed ‘until nothing is left’.  For example: I would speculate that this could take the form of legislated provisions for co-determination, or industrial rights including minimum wages and conditions. (though to be honest this is against the grain of so-called ‘reform of the labour market’ under successive governments, Labor and Liberal)   Karleby was critical of narrow interpretations of socialism which focused only on nationalisation.

For Adam Ford ‘socialist outcomes’ do not adhere to “pre-determined” and “known” “socialist structures”.  And rather than comprising an enduring beacon for socialists, the figure of Karl Marx is seen as imposing a “straight-jacket” on socialist thought.

Finally, Adam Ford condemns not only ‘command economies’ as ‘stupid’; but he applies the same judgement to mixed economies where the public sector extends beyond “natural public monopolies”, and certain essential services and infrastructure which the market would not provide via its own devices.

What follows is a response to Adam Ford’s arguments.

The hinting of a Bernsteinian angle is appreciated.  Bernstein had a lot of relevant things to say about socialism and ethics, socialism and liberalism, and the notion there no absolutely-final ‘end point’ for socialism. 

Though Bernstein had also insisted of Marx’s theory:

“The fall of the profit rate is a fact, the advent of over-production and crises is a fact, periodic diminution of capital is a fact, the concentration and centralisation of industrial capital is a fact, the increase of the rate of surplus value is a fact.”   (Bernstein, Pp 41-42)   

Ford is right to suggest that in Marxism we do not have the meaning of ‘life, the universe and everything’.  Ethics, for instance, was a blind spot for Marx and many who followed in his tradition and in his name.  As was the tendency of Marxists – not least of all Lenin – to pose socialism and liberalism practically as polar opposites.  (Whereas for Bernstein socialism comprised ‘liberalism’s spiritual successor’) 
Certainly it is fashionable in this day and age to decry the ‘old’ socialism. The neo-liberal Ideology remains largely hegemonic throughout much of the world.  Public ownership is seen as an anachronism.  ‘The market’ is revered; ‘command economies’ are reviled.  And indeed – even for those proposing a democratic mixed economy, the spectre of the ‘command economy’ hangs over all debate as if there really is no ‘middle path’ or otherwise diverging paths from those of neo-liberalism and so-called ‘state socialism’.  Though to be fair to Adam Ford he personally diverges significantly from neo-liberalism in proposing a thorough regime of regulation.  And his allowance for natural public monopoly puts him at odds with the likes of Mises or Hayek.

As already observed: Nils Karleby shared similar notions to Ford in the sense of emphasising regulation as the substance of socialisation; the means of negating ‘capitalist prerogatives’. Though Karleby himself had also argued:

“How can one imagine a social transformation other than by the growth of collective property at the expense of private property, and through legislative changes together with social and cultural policy measures, and through changes in property rights brought about by the influence of free organisations?” 

 

And further Karleby anticipates a

 

“grinding away of capitalist society in the true sense, a steady progressive growth of new social forms.”  (Karleby in Tilton, p 82)

Hence despite his emphasis on regulation-as-socialism Karleby does not deny the mixed economy.  Though perhaps his position is also suggestive of strategies such as democratic collective capital formation for example.

Again: Ford rejects “predetermined” “socialist structures”. Most particularly this appears to relate to state ownership ; but perhaps it also applies to collective forms of property posed in opposition to exploitative labour-capital relations.  Though Ford also suggests “democratic markets”.  What could this mean?

In truth I have considered “democratic markets” myself.  But here I conceive of a wide variety of producer and consumer co-operative forms, as well as collective capital formation and so on.  I think of workers and consumers organising collectively and co-operatively in the very midst of markets. And I envisage of the state playing an enabling role here: via state aid, including cheap credit, tax breaks and so on.

Still - any role for the state is really the rare exception for Ford.  But is a truly robust mixed economy really “stupid”?

True: Ford and I agree on the need for “natural public monopolies”.  Ford is not specific, but for me here I think of energy, water, communications and transport infrastructure. I also think of near-monopolies in education.  But why not extend strategic socialisation beyond these strictly conceived boundaries?  Government business enterprises can enhance competition in areas as diverse as banking and health insurance; also providing progressive cross-subsidisation where that makes sense. Dividends can potentially be socialised into the tens of billions empowering the extension of welfare and the social wage.  In areas such as mining partial socialisation via some ‘super profits tax’ made sense ; but opposition to a direct public stake here could be seen as Ideological. In any case - even a public sector mining company would operate in a global and competitive market. As could other competitive state enterprises.

Furthermore: ‘the market’ could no-doubt ‘find a way’ to intrude upon just about every facet of our existence. But should we allow for it to do so?  Are ‘markets’ and the profit motive appropriate in Aged Care for example?  The public sector needs to intervene where the market fails.  And market failure takes many forms. This includes the lack of democratic forms; the exploitation of vulnerable people; as well as ‘Planned obsolescence’ and the creation of oligopolies and monopolies which fleece consumers. Also there is the potential for neglect of consumer minorities whose ‘market power’ is not sufficient to ensure the provision of the highest quality goods and services at competitive prices.  Perhaps Ford allows for this final case in his model, however.  Though the question remains: how would that work?

Then there’s also a case for strategic government intervention in support of ‘multi-stakeholder-co-operative enterprise’. Government has a potentially progressive role to play in helping to finance co-operative enterprise large and small.  Especially in the case of large co-operative enterprise large injections of capital may be necessary to attain the economies of scale necessary to remain competitive on global markets. This is where government can help.  And not only State and Federal government – but regions as well.

Underlying rejections of a larger role for government is the notion that private ownership is “natural”.  It is considered the ‘default” form of property compared with which the public sector is but a rare exception. 

I reject this notion. But I do suppose a large role for competitive private sector markets into the foreseeable future.  A ‘democratic mixed economy’ is realisable in the foreseeable future in a relatively modest form. To illustrate: I personally envisage an increase in public revenues and associated outlays by 5 per cent of GDP – achieved perhaps over a decade, and flowing in to social wage and welfare provisions.  As well as public borrowings for ‘nation-building’ infrastructure. 

But ‘autarky’ is not the answer.  As I have argued elsewhere: transnational enterprises from Samsung to Apple respond to ‘the intricacies of consumer demand’. And they innovate under pressure in the context of competitive markets where massive economies of scale are necessary.

Nor should we aspire to ‘nationalise the corner store’.  This has always gone without saying.  Though small-scale co-operatives could also potentially respond to those ‘intricacies’ at the local level as well; while addressing the alienation many workers experience where they have little creative control over their workplaces and their labours.

Australian consumers don’t want to be isolated from the innovations that go on in competitive global markets. And Australian workers also stand to benefit from jobs-creating foreign investment.  I accept this. No-one (or at least almost no-one) wants ‘socialism in one country, Stalinist-style’.  We can gradually build up to a robust democratic mixed economy. But the ‘traditional socialist society’ as epitomised by the old Soviet and Eastern bloc is ‘lost to us’. 

In some ways this is actually a good thing.  The old command economies produced a ‘dictatorship over needs’ (Fehr, Heller, Markus) where ‘needs’ were defined ‘from above’ and consumers did not enjoy the freedom to determine their own needs-structures via markets.  Markets can be appropriate to the extent to which they enhance responsiveness to consumer demand, and reasonably enhance personal determination of needs structures.

But we should not adopt an Ideological perspective which closes off the strategic extension of the public sector.  Nor should we fetishize markets – especially where they fail.  And we should not just jettison the Marxist tradition in its entirety – when there is such a rich and diverse range of viewpoints and insights even still.  Even though in today’s more plural Left there is greater tolerance towards the pursuit of ‘ethical’ or even ‘liberal’ socialism.  (a good thing) 

We probably can define socialism ‘however we choose’.  But we should also ask ourselves what is reasonable when we return to ‘first principles’.  Socialism began with notions of economic equality; notions of ‘equal association’. There was also the communist notion of ‘From each according to ability, to each according to need’.  And that notion still retains its force today.  Though quite rightly the modern Left has also considered that economic equality alone is not enough to achieve ‘The Good Society’.  A ‘good society’ and a ‘strong democracy’ needs to include a participatory and authentic public sphere.  It must encompass mutual respect and free enquiry.  It must support peoples’ need for economic security; but also peoples’ search for meaning in many-varied ways.  Whereas the Left once focused its attentions on nationalisation too-narrowly, however, the opposite tendency to reject public ownership as a strategy is itself ‘Ideological’. Democratic socialists are learning from past errors.  But it is not a ‘clean break’.  Our efforts today should still be informed to a significant extent by past insights, and past tradition.

 

Bibliography 

Bernstein, Eduard  “Evolutionary Socialism”, Shocken Books, NewYork, 1961

Tilton, Timothy; “The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy – Through the Welfare State to Socialism”; Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990

Reflections on the democratic Marxism of Karl Kautsky

above:  A lithograph of the 'Red Pope' Karl Kautsky

What follows is an essay which attempts to identify the defensible and valuable legacy that the democratic Marxist Karl Kautsky provided for the Left during the pre-1914 period.  It is largely based upon a reading of his seminal ‘The Road to Power’. (1909)

 

The author further attempts to discern what ramifications Kautsky’s works during this period might have also for the current day – around 100 years later.

 

The following essay also compromises a brief, edited segment (in-progress) of the author (Tristan Ewins’)  (as yet uncompleted) PhD thesis on Third Roads and Third Ways on the Left 1848-1948.  

 

Debate is very welcome!!!

Work-in-Progress;  Tristan Ewins Feb 2013 

There are many themes addressed in Kautsky’s work that provide the basis for a defensible legacy; and others that are perhaps less defensible.  This brief essay is mainly derived fro a reading of Kautksy’s  1909 work ‘The Road to Power’, with some consideration of ‘The Erfurt Program’ (The Class Struggle), as well as ‘On the Morrow of the Social Revolution’, and “The Social Revolution’. (1903)  However we do not draw here upon Kautksy’s seminal debate with Lenin which occurred following the 1917 October Bolshevik Revolution.  (including Kautsky’s ‘The Dictatorship of the Proletariat’; and Lenin’s “The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky’)

 

In Kautksy’s favour it is to be noted that Materialism and determinism are still widely considered respectable philosophical positions: and Kautsky is quite radical and unyielding in his adherence to such a perspective.  And yet intuitively that position remains problematic – as how could consciousness and will arise out of a purely material (ie: mechanical) process?  Herbert Marcuse had dared to posit a ‘great refusal’ of the most marginal and oppressed as creating a new historic agent for revolution.  The idea that such minorities could lead a revolution is suggestive of a radical voluntarism. And yet liberal capitalism has – to a significant degree - again ‘adapted’, co-opted and neutralised these elements.

 

It is probably fair to argue that (from a Marxist perspective) ‘something went wrong’  in the evolution of capitalism -  such that the system evolved in a way which neutralised the very critical elements it had given rise to: the enlightened and revolutionary working class who – according to Marx and Kautsky - were supposed to be the system’s ‘gravediggers’.  The question, here, is whether Kautskyan determinism and materialism are helps or hindrances under such circumstances.  Critical theorist Theodore Adorno would have it that a capitalist ‘culture industry’ lulls and deceives us into passivity; and decades since he made such observations psychological manipulation via mass culture appears more pervasive and powerful than ever.  In addition to that, the decline of mass factory labour – the phenomenon of ‘post-industrialism’ – also contributes to the demobilisation of the working class, and the decline of a distinct class consciousness.

A Kautskyan (pure materialist) outlook might hold the position to hopeless.  Again: this might begin to look like “a bad totality with no way out”. (Beilharz)  And yet again: perhaps the new information technology provides the material basis for ‘levelling the playing field’ somewhat in the contest of ideas.  And a moderate voluntarism – which accepts our grounding based on experience, but holds some prospect for the human imagination and for collective free human will, might suppose these provide a ‘potential way out’.  Kautsky would reject suppositions of free will and unbound human imagination. But perhaps he would appreciate the new technology as a ‘material grounding’ for hope; and for ‘asymmetrical political struggle’. 

 

And it is also notable that relative abundance creates ‘new’ (ie: relative) needs.  While Kautsky foresaw limits to social education in his own time, today there are the material means to provide education not only for the labour market, but for active and critical citizenship, and for well-rounded human beings.  The question of whether workers and citizens can be mobilised around the defence of ‘newer’ established rights (pensions, leave, education, health); or even inspired to fight for new social conquests (eg: a standard 32 hour week) is an open one.  Perhaps there is no guarantee of success as much as there is no guarantee of failure.  Kautsky found it difficult wrestling with the prospect of uncertainty in response to Revisionism.  But today radicals face the imperative of fostering hope even without the old teleological certainties of the old Marxism.

 

The question of ‘economism’ versus ‘political socialism’ is also interesting to approach in light of Kautsky’s work. Kautsky is often accused of ‘economism’ for his insistence – following Engels – that the ‘economic base’ determines the cultural and political ‘superstructure’ ‘in the last instance’ – but with ‘relative autonomy’ during the interim.  Indeed, Marxism itself is often more broadly accused of ‘economism’ by comparison with ‘political socialism’.  Perhaps it is this important qualification (re: relative autonomy) which makes the Kautskyan position more nuanced than is commonly supposed.  Interestingly, Kautsky maintains the distinction between trade union and social democratic consciousness precisely because the struggle over wages and conditions alone is not enough to resolve capitalist contradictions.  Insofar as the State provides an obstacle, the precondition for transforming the economy is the political transformation of the State – and hence the economic and the political struggle are necessarily intertwined.   But undoubtedly Kautsky does underplay the importance of political, religious and cultural motives driving great struggles, and largely reduces those struggles to the context of the class struggle and evolving mode of production.

 

In a world today where the very idea of class struggle faces stigmatisation Kautsky is adamant that not only that the working class must struggle; but that the antagonisms between it and the bourgeoisie cannot be resolved except for revolution.  Antagonism is a recurring theme for Kautsky in the context of a presumption of class struggle: placing him in stark relief as against modern social democratic ideologies that seek social peace based upon social amelioration.  Again: here revolution for Kautsky did not mean ‘violence’, ‘chaos’, ‘insurrection’ – But simply qualitative change; the achievement of a new constitution one way of another (preferably through non-violent class struggle) with the consequence of a democratic state, and a democratic economy.  Kautsky allows for the possibility of gradualism in the social revolution as also supposed by the reformists, but stands firm on the qualitative nature of the change he is pursuing for the State and the economy.  And given his assumption of the State’s class nature, he sees political revolution (ie: the proletariat achieving a dominant position within the State) as the necessary prerequisite for such qualitative change.  Though we might suppose that the very process of the working class ‘achieving a dominant position in the State’ could also comprise a struggle lasting decades.  (or in a fashion contrary to Kautsky’s optimism, indeed we may now question whether we will ever reach that goal)

 

Modern ‘Third Ways’ dispute the need for ‘revolution’; indeed the bulk of third way theorists and practitioners today would consider the very idea ‘absurd.’  Indeed they largely abandon any radical redistributive agenda – arguing for social and economic ‘inclusion’ as the means of conciliation.  In practice this means amelioration for the most marginal and oppressed.  And indeed the corresponding policies matter a great deal to the excluded, the impoverished, and the marginalised themselves.

 

But the logic of capitalism is generally towards greater intensity of exploitation, and conciliation must also mean lasting peace (ie: an end to Imperialist war) if it is to be substantial.  Rather Kautsky looks towards a socialist future where there is universal conciliation and social peace – not on the basis of a compromise settlement – but on the grounds of the elimination of the antagonisms caused by exploitation, capitalist contradictions and Imperialism. 

 

But Kautsky’s confidence  for the future seems to have been misplaced in retrospect.  And Bernstein’s endeavour for partial conciliation based on universal citizenship, and social as well as liberal rights - could form a bulwark against violent ideologies.  (eg: fascism)  Yet citizenship does not end the class struggle.  Rather it establishes a framework and a foothold for that struggle – which can prevent an escalation into ever greater violence and repression – and hence the corruption of the very emancipatory ambitions which drive socialist movements. 

 

But this does not exclude great struggles between great social forces.  It has been argued that the corporatist structures that ultimately developed in Sweden are notable as they effectively transposed the class struggle to a different (institutional) level.  This has been theorised at length by Swedish sociologist, Walter Korpi in his ‘Power Resources’ approach. 

 

Here, though, Kautsky’s vision of such great struggles seems well adaptable to a Gramscian vision of ‘wars of position’ – waged over the course of decades through the various strongholds of civil society.  Although the promise of social peace has great appeal for many; and can provide the vehicle for reform agendas – albeit agendas which do not involve the definitive resolution of capitalist contradictions.  Provisional ‘settlements’, here, are important in the context of such organised class struggle spanning decades.  But in a world where the ‘teleological guarantees’ of the old Marxism appear discredited a ‘historic compromise’ which provides dignity and security, and environmental sustainability – would certainly be a step forwards.

 

But this brings us to the theme of imiseration and class bifurcation.  Here Bernstein appears to have been largely vindicated.  Exploitation – in the sense of surplus extraction - has become more and more intense – but technological and productive advances have created relative abundance even amidst gross and unnecessary waste.  The issue of environmental sustainability throws this state of affairs into question, but nonetheless there is now the scenario of relative prosperity even amidst more and more intense exploitation.  (although shifts in the world economic order may change this so far as the West is concerned) Yet class bifurcation does remain a  tendency; a tendency which operates alongside different tendencies towards social differentiation, and the re-emergence of ‘middle’ or ‘intermediatory’ classes in different forms as capitalism revolutionises and modernises itself constantly.

 

In retrospect the very idea of a Marxist theoretical orthodoxy suggests a position which is closed to adaptation in response to evolving circumstances.  Though Kautsky himself would probably point to the materialist conception of history: and argue that in that theoretical approach there already existed the framework and means necessary for adaptation.  Kautsky’s supposition of ever greater economic crises appeared to have been vindicated with the Great Depression; and yet he also failed to predict the rise of fascism – emerging from the same crises he had presumed would usher in socialism.  This raises the question:  was there a problem with the materialist conception of history, or was it merely the way it was applied by socialist theorists?   Various theorists (Steger, Berman etc) have argued that Kautsky’s materialist determinism was a recipe for passivity with its assumptions of ‘inevitable’ change.  As we have already considered, therefore, perhaps a position between radical determinism/materialism and radical voluntarism is most appropriate – recognising limits to the individual will; but holding out hope for human agency, and the motivating assumption that “yes, we can make a difference”  Or in other words, following Berman ‘structure and agency condition each other’.

 

And yet if ‘orthodoxy’ means fidelity to enduring principles and concepts, Kautsky has left a defensible legacy in his own defence of the insights of Karl Marx.   Tendencies towards monopoly, intensified exploitation, alienation, crises of overproduction and the correspondingly desperate attempts to expand the world market, class struggle, falling rates of profit,– all remain with us today as by-products of modern capitalism.  And the ‘secret’ of surplus value – identified by Marx and popularised by Kautsky – still implies in its functioning a devastating moral critique of capitalism; while also comprising the means of capitalist systemic reproduction. 

 

If ‘revisionism’ takes not the form of necessary adjustment to changing circumstances, but rather abandoning crucial insights for the sake of ‘intellectual fashion’, then perhaps there is something to be said for ‘orthodoxy’.  Kautsky’s championing of enduring Marxist concepts and categories therefore remains a defensible legacy even today.  Though nonetheless it would be fair to suggest that the Marxists of Kautsky’s time could not possibly predict the future trajectories of modern capitalism’s development.  Some basic, vital systemic dynamics – as identified by Marx and promoted by Kautsky – remain. (as we have just observed above) But in other ways capitalism keeps evolving, adapting, mutating – surviving where Marxists assumed socialist transition was necessary, ‘inevitable’; for Kautsky “the only thing possible”..

 

Writing in opposition to “the violence of Austrian anarchists” (we observe, here, the philosophy of ‘the propaganda of the deed’, the policy of assassinations etc)  Kautsky once wrote;

“Social Democracy is a Party of human love, and it must always remain conscious of its character even in the midst of the most frenzied political fights”. (Kautksy in Steenson, p 80)

 

In his biography of Kautsky, Steenson depicts a man “very sensitive to human suffering”; the kind of man who fought for the rights of unwed mothers and their children and condemned the hypocrisy of those who separated them, institutionalising the children. Kautsky’s concern for human suffering was not merely abstract.  Steenson relates that this disposition of Kautsky’s was later to “cause him to baulk in the face of  the apparent necessity for revolutionary violence.”  (Steenson, p 80)

 

Kautsky’s position on violence was especially important given  the era of ‘War and Revolution’ which was to follow the publication of his seminal ‘The Road to Power’.

 

But that would involve a deeper assessment - beyond the frame of this short excerpt from my developing PhD thesis. It is enough for now to note a complexity in Kautsky that is often unrecognised in works condemning his “passivity” – stemming from his philosophical materialism. ‘Fatalism’ was sometimes a consequence of Kautsky’s interpretation of historical materialism.  But in practice no man did more than Kautsky to popularise Marxism in the pre-1917 period.  Rather than ‘writing Kautsky off’, perhaps it is better to let  him speak for himself.   And while we have not quoted him at length in this excerpt, it is to be hoped I have provided an accurate impression of his work, and that work’s relevance – especially those works of the pre-1917 period.   (though his later works were of equal historical imporantance…)

 

Bibliography

Kautsky, Karl  “The Class Struggle” (Erfurt Program),  The Norton Library, Toronto, 1971

 

Kautsky, Karl “On the Morrow of the Social Revolution”, The Twentieth Century Press, Clerkenwell, 1903

Kautksy, Karl, “The Road to Power – Political Reflections on Growing into the Revolution,  Humanities Press, New Jersey, 1992 

Kautsky, Karl  “The Social Revolution”, The Twentieth Century Press, Clerkenwell, 1903

 

A Democratic Economy for the Left- a friendly reply to Eric Aarons

above: Social democratic economist Karl Polanyi - author of 'The Great Transformation'

In this our latest article Shayn McCallum responds to Eric Aarons again on the theme of the Democratic Mixed Economy.  Drawing from the insights of Karl Polanyi McCallum argues for a democratic mixed economy employing both markets and planning, but moving beyond 'the market society'.  For McCallum economy must serve society and not vice versa.  This includes environmental preservation.  

Honest and respectful debate always welcome!!!

The Democratic Mixed Economy Facebook group can be found here: http://www.facebook.com/groups/152326549326/

And our 'Left Focus' Facebook Group can be found here:  http://www.facebook.com/groups/58243419565/

New participants welcome!   

Shayn McCallum, October 2012

I appreciate the response that Eric Aarons recently made to my recent article on a democratic mixed economy. His critique raised a number of important points that I had been either entirely unable to address or at least unable to expand on in my paper which had been originally written as a contribution to discussions on economic policy within the Party of European Socialists, first being circulated within the French Socialist Party and German SPD.  I also offered it within the UK Fabian society as a critique of Ed Miliband’s “Decent Capitalism”.  Indeed, my main target in writing the original article, as much as to promote the idea of what I term (albeit imperfectly) a “democratic mixed economy” was to attack the use of the term “decent capitalism” which, I feel, is an unfortunate choice, linguistically and semiotically, that sets the parameters of the debate on economic policy at exactly the wrong point.

This original article was somewhat truncated to meet maximum length requirements and, therefore, was only partially able to convey the theoretical position I am coming from.   As I feel a more detailed explication of this background may serve to clarify the areas in which my approach and Eric’s both converge and diverge, I would like to take the time to more clearly set out my assumptions below.

To begin with, I’d like to go over some of the areas where I feel Eric and I are closer than it may appear based on my original article and Eric’s subsequent response.  Firstly; both Eric and I share an ecological emphasis.  This may not be terribly clear from my original article but, in fact, we both appear to be agreed on the need to prioritise the issue of environmental destruction and, therefore, question any economic model based on untrammelled growth.  I hinted at this very briefly in my original argument by including a few sentences rejecting the idea that there is much value in trying to reinvent manufacturing in the advanced capital-dominated societies.  Also, like Eric, I am not overly challenged by the idea of a post-industrial society (although this involves problematic aspects which I will come to further on in this response).   Furthermore, I would also tend to agree with Eric that econocentric arguments reducing socialism to questions of property forms are caught in an overly-limiting approach that is, at best, irrelevant and at worst, totally incapable of offering cogent responses to modern realities.  Although, due to being an article focusing on economic issues, it may not have been clear; my intention was largely to attack econocentric thinking, which remains deeply imprinted in our collective consciousness.

With all respect to the considerable genius of Karl Marx, the Left remains burdened with the legacy of “Marxism” which, I would argue, is merely the flip-side of neo-liberalism, in that both approaches are agreed on the centrality of economics.  This is, ironically, part of the reason why neo-liberalism gained so much ground among social-democrats after the rise of Thatcher and Reagan in the 1980’s and the collapse of Soviet-style socialism in the last year of that decade.  The either/or, Marxism vs. Liberalism discourse ultimately obscured what was always really going on within the advanced, capital-dominated societies.  Although capitalism is a force that has, especially in recent years, established greater and greater dominance, I do not feel it is entirely accurate to simply refer to most modern economies or societies as “capitalist” as this obscures the complexity of what is actually occurring.  Capital has had to struggle to establish and hold onto its hegemony over the course of its dominance.  “Capitalism” (meaning the hegemony of capital) is a reality, but it is not as strong as either the Marxist approach, nor that of its neo-liberal mirror image, would have us believe.  In fact, a brief look at the actual history of capitalism shows its hold to have been marked by constant precariousness and unending setbacks resulting from its many, obvious failures and the ways in which societies have organised to check and restrict its power. Failing to realise this, amounts to short-changing ourselves at exactly the moment when we have an opening to fundamentally change our way of life for the better.

To clarify where I am coming from; I should explain that my own theoretical position is strongly rooted in the thought of the sovereign socialist thinker Karl Polanyi, whose nuanced critique of capitalism was equally critical of the economism of Marx’ approach.

Polanyi and anti-economism

Karl Polanyi was a sovereign socialist of Hungarian origin who authored one of the most comprehensive critiques of capitalism produced from outside the Marxist tradition; The Great Transformation (which Eric clearly alludes to in the title of his response to my article).  Indeed, Polanyi was seriously critical of Marx, in that, Marx’ own critique of capitalism was fundamentally econocentric.  The eschatological historicism of Marx that predicted an inevitable collapse of the capitalist system and/or its overthrow by the socialist proletariat was based on one serious error; that the free-market capitalism described by the classical economists such as Smith and Ricardo represented the economy as it actually was (or would become in time as the last remnants of feudalism were expunged) rather than merely as an idealised, utopian model.  In reality, capitalism, as envisaged by the classical economists, is an impossible system- a utopia (or dystopia) capable of functioning only on paper.  This contention of Polanyi’s is borne out by the fact that, whenever there is an attempt to establish a self-regulating market system, collapse occurs soon after.  Polanyi himself witnessed the Great Depression and we are currently witnessing the second proof of Polanyi’s theory as the rotten fruits of three decades of neo-liberalism are reaped over our heads. 

Liberal economists, of course, always counter from the opposite perspective; blaming government intervention or imperfect policies for inhibiting the growth of the “true” self-regulating market yet, quite honestly, whilst this ever-ready excuse that things went wrong because the capitalism involved was not “pure” capitalism should be given more credibility than the frustrated Marxist claim that the Soviet bloc collapsed because it was not “pure” socialism, is beyond me.  The reality appears to be that there is always something blocking the “pure market economy” and always will be because such an economy, in reality, is utterly unworkable.  Most people, not just the working-class, will want to oppose it or, at the very least, modify it to reduce its extremes.  Thus the undying nature of the liberal dream paralleling that of the convinced Marxist; “our system would surely work if only people would stop getting in the way and diluting its purity”. We are faced with a hermetically-sealed, self-replicating logic as un-debatable as an item of religious faith.

According to Polanyi however, society must be understood as an organic whole, of which the economy is but one embedded part.  Unlike Marx who divided a society into its “base” and “superstructure”, Polanyi made the point that this econocentrism had only emerged with the industrial revolution and was part of the ideology of this revolution.  For most of history, the economic question had been secondary and embedded within a broader network of culture, social expectations, legal arrangements and political systems.  The specific feature of capitalism, as a rising force, was a conscious effort to extinguish pre-industrial and pre-capitalist modes of existence to impose “the rule of economics” over the whole society.  Where under feudalism, with all its abuses, ordinary people enjoyed certain unspoken social rights, primarily the right to live by, if all else failed, hunting and gathering on common land, measures such as the famous enclosures act forced the poor to seek their means of sustenance by selling their labour on the market.  The important feature of the rule of capital was its totalitarian nature- its quest to privatise common space in order to ensure total compliance with the market.

Moreover, “the market” was no longer the simple merchant’s or trader’s market that had existed and evolved in most societies able to support more than a subsistence economy but rather a new system based on legal contracts in which virtually every form of commodity could be traded.  As Eric points out in his response, financial markets and consumer markets are of a different nature yet “market economics” ignores this fact and treats all commodities as basically similar.  Land, labour and capital may all be bought, sold or rented alongside consumer goods and professional services in a theoretical space of free and open mutual contracts entered into willingly by buyers and sellers.  What the rising capitalist class intended to do was to make this system pervasive so that, rather than the multi-level feudal economy based on taxation/tribute and peasant subsistence with trade existing, however sophisticated, as a secondary pursuit by the urban bourgeoisie and peasant farmers producing enough to trade in surpluses, capitalism was a system seeking to enshrine trade and exchange as the central economic mechanism.  The dream of capitalism, in other words, is not merely a “market economy” (to replace the multi-tiered economies of the pre-capitalist era) but, in effect, a “market society”.

So far, none of this picture much contradicts Marx, however the important difference between Polanyian and Marxian narratives is that, unlike Marx who believed that the capitalist revolution had been successfully completed, or at least soon would be, Polanyi argued that the reality was somewhat more complex.  People resisted the imposition of the economy on their lives creating, what Polanyi termed “a double movement” in which every attempt to advance capitalism was met by popular resistance, necessitating compromises and accommodations between the revolutionary capitalist class and the various counter-forces (which included, alongside the nascent urban proletariat, the peasantry, dispossessed feudal aristocracies, petit bourgeoisie and various other groups all presenting a range of, often contradictory and antagonistic, objections to market rule).  Unlike Marx, who envisaged a revolutionary awakening in the urban proletariat as the dialectical antithesis of this capitalist rise, Polanyi saw a conservative resistance to a revolutionary capitalist class attempting to preserve, and later extend, rights which were being extinguished.  Moreover, it was this initially conservative response that empowered the radical answer in socialism which Polanyi defined as “the tendency inherent in an industrial civilisation to transcend the self-regulating market by consciously subordinating it to a democratic society”[1]. 

Marx had ambiguous feelings towards democracy.  Towards the end of his life, he began to speculate that, in countries such as Britain at least, socialism might yet be introduced peacefully.  For most of his life however, Marx saw parliamentary democracy, in particular, as little more than a bourgeois trick.  Subsequent orthodox Marxists belittled and ridiculed notions such as “the parliamentary road to socialism” and the revisionist ideas of Bernstein that, in the end, despite the ongoing embarrassment they caused, came to roost in the practice, if not theory, of virtually the entire European socialist movement (including the Eurocommunist parties).  Whilst Marxists disdained the political, seeing all politics under capitalism as bourgeois politics, the success of socialist parties- not necessarily in building (capital “s”)“Socialism” as conceived in its pure form, but in forcing back the power of capital, clearly show its effectiveness.  This success is much under-estimated, I believe, due to the ideological blinkers imposed by orthodox Marxism.  According to the Marxist “revolutionary” reading of social-democracy, reformism was a form of betrayal and the reformist working-class suffering from “false consciousness” however, for Polanyi, like Bernstein before him, this slow, incremental struggle in the field of politics was the natural form of the struggle for socialism itself in a democratic (or democratising society). Moreover, for Polanyi, this process of democratisation was, in itself, part of the socialist struggle per se.

Looking at modern history through Polanyian eyes, everything suddenly makes sense.   Whereas Marxists struggle to account for the lack of revolutionary fervour in the European working-class and liberals insist that capitalism and democracy are inseparable twins, a Polanyian reading of history sees democracy emerging and advancing largely against capital.  This is particularly obvious in the neo-liberal era as democracy is being increasingly reduced to an empty ritual whilst “the market” is held up as an apolitical, “common sense” area not to be interfered with by meddling politicians or the unwashed plebeian masses with their “market distorting” trade unions, environmental organisations and other barriers to the sovereignty of business.  In truth, “capitalism” has never managed to fully establish itself although it has acquired considerable ideological force, because, in the end, most people (including smaller capitalists) don’t want to live in the kind of dystopia capitalism actually implies.  If “pure” capitalism were ever established, it would quite simply resemble hell for almost everyone (shades of which we can see in the U.S. or Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland among others)- a system with no security where every individual was seeking the maximisation of their own self-interest and the losers were simply “left to the wolves”.  Modern “capitalism” as we live it is a compromise and always must be.

“Economic Freedom” and “Freedom from Economics”

The neo-liberals rankle against the necessity of this “market-distorting” compromise which has arisen as a result of subordinating the economy to society through the mechanism of democracy and have instead, attempted to create a conceptual universe based on “economic freedom” and have moved to enact policies, over the last 30 years, which entrench this mythology.

 “Freedom” in neo-liberal terms is the freedom to enter contracts, to buy and sell at liberty and to act in one’s own self-interest.  It does not take a great deal of effort to expose the shoddiness of this conception of freedom which, for the majority does not even amount to meaningful economic freedom (for example; can the “right” to work for subsistence wages or starve be considered a genuinely free choice? Yet this is the essence of the neo-liberal approach to unemployment). 

The socialist answer to capitalism, has always been, in effect, to propose “freedom from economics”.  Marx’ rare ruminations on communism envision a society where work is no longer mere “labour” but performed as an act of contribution to the society or self-fulfillment, for which each individual may expect the satisfaction of his/her material needs without the need for elaborate accounting.  It is a beautiful vision and one worth dreaming about for the very distant future.  For the forseeable future however, we may have to tolerate some degree of economic rule over our lives.  Nonetheless, the goal of the Left must be to “put economics in its place”.  The economy must serve humanity and not the other way around.  In other words, rather than the empty ideal of “economic freedom” which presents a false definition of what it means to be free, the Left must continue to struggle for “freedom from economics”.

Ironically however, to free ourselves from economics we must turn our attention more to economic issues.  I would like to assure Eric that, perhaps contrary to the impression given in my previous article, I am not altogether dismissing questions of culture as political issues, yet, I must insist that these must not become the sole, or primary, focus of politics in the current period.  Unfortunately, for the moment, economics truly is the “substance” of politics because the market has enslaved us.  How can we doubt this for a second when the richest, most prosperous societies in the world are facing galloping poverty rates, massive unemployment and the wholesale destruction of social services?  Moreover, this is all occurring in the middle of unprecedented material abundance.  Throughout Greece and Spain the shelves of shopping centres and supermarkets groan with an abundance of goods even as the streets outside fill with the recently impoverished and unemployed who lack the economic means to consume what is available.  Here we see the tyranny of economics and the waste and inefficiency of a market society. Production and distribution are misaligned.

This does not imply that the only, or even preferred solution is a return to Soviet-style planning.  The downfalls of this system have been enumerated at length for years.  Nor is there much point asserting some utopian notion of “democratic planning”(not that it mighn’t be a good idea to experiment with this on a small scale) or some other exotic solution.  People used to being able to determine their own consumption preferences in the marketplace are unlikely to want to replace this with a totally planned system no matter how democratic.  Markets clearly have their place but what should that place be?  What goods and services should be covered by the market and which should be provided as untraded “social goods”?  These are important questions.  Few people much mind having a variety of restaurants to go to or a choice of clothing styles or technological items but perhaps many of us do not feel a pressing need for a variety of power providers competing to sell us electricity or a host of private banking institutions that differ only to the extent that they are ripping us off.  And there are other “empty” choices that would perhaps be more satisfactorily be taken over by well-run, transparent, public service providers (or perhaps a combination of public and third-sector non-profit providers if so desired) such as education, health, public utilities and welfare services.

My reason for proposing a “democratic mixed economy” (and I should point out I am not “married” to the term but prefer it, for a number of reasons, to any of the alternatives on offer) is to allow for an open-ended experimental approach to reorganising the economy that puts people first, through the democratic, participatory mechanism and which is open-ended with regard to the question of the role and limitations of markets, the ownership and property mechanisms that exist and the degree of state, as opposed to private, cooperative or third-sector delivery of services.  My own orientation within such a framework, would be strongly towards the socialist end of the continuum and the “mix” I would prefer would perhaps be leaning heavily towards the public/cooperative/mutualist approach but, in the end it would not be me but the majority which would (hopefully) have the final say on the composition of the mix (which would be bound to change over time anyway- probably in ways we cannot even foresee).

Issues of Economic Structure and Governance

Of course, as Eric pointed out, with regard to Australia but, in fact it is also largely true of all the advanced economies, we are no longer dealing with “industrial” but rather “post-industrial” economies in most of the wealthy nations.  As I mentioned above, I do not feel the shift to a service economy is, in itself, a particularly terrible thing any more than it can be seen as intrinsically emancipatory.  There is, however, an important element to this structural shift which presents a far more serious problem for the Left: the growing international division of labour effected by “globalisation”.

It should be obvious to anyone that, no matter how abstracted from any kind of material production most of our jobs become, someone somewhere has to be growing the food we eat, buy, sell, market or advertise just as someone has to manufacture the clothes we wear, the vehicles we travel in and the computers we increasingly rely on in our service-sector jobs.  The idea of a “virtual economy” is a risible fantasy that can only exist as long as we are prepared to ignore the fact that everything we really need to stay alive is physically produced somewhere.

Indeed, the shift from a “production” to a “consumption” oriented society was one of the pillars of neo-liberal strategy.  As Marx pointed out, when we view economic processes as consumers it is easy to ignore the injustices and exploitation that delivers us cheap goods, however, if we look at the same process through the eyes of producers, all of these miseries become clear.  Not only did killing off industry in the wealthy countries have the effect of increasing unemployment (and therefore facilitating union-busting and assaults on wages in order to pursue the anti-inflationary policies that neo-liberals are so in love with) but also allowed large companies to deepen the international division of labour that is so beloved of free-trade theory, by relocating manufacturing to the cheap-labour havens of the “developing world”.

Add to this the fact that there is no equivalent of the state at international level to govern or regulate these processes and it is quite clear that this whole process has had a great deal to do with a strategic flanking of the postwar social-democratic compromise.  Governments renounced their competencies over economics “for the greater good” leaving no political response to market rule easily available.

To a large extent, this explains the “deer caught in the headlamps” response of social-democrats to the current global economic crisis.  The tools simply do not yet exist to do much about the problems we face.  Where governance mechanisms are being instituted however, as can be seen at present in the European Union, they are not of a democratic nature but rather embody a technocratic response aimed at preserving the hegemony of capital, if not the self-regulating market nonsense that has had its dirty underwear exposed yet again.

So, what to do?  In this era, international coordination among Leftists is a matter of survival.  This is something I have been actively struggling for in the Party of European Socialists.  Socialists and social-democrats in Europe (which is my primary focus as I live on the margins of Europe in Istanbul, Turkey)  need to work much more unitedly to present structural reforms at the European level that would enable greater democratic participation and transparency as well as advance a Europe-wide “social Europe” agenda.  This is not an easy proposition as the European institutions are weighed down with layers of treaties, bureaucratic and technocratic measures and entrenched ideologies that are firmly opposed to reform.  The European Union was specifically conceived of as a “benign technocracy” rather than a democracy as its architects feared (probably correctly) that European public opinion would be hostile to integration- let alone political union.

The need to reform Europe is only one, fairly limited, step in the struggle to reform globalisation.  I, personally, do not consider globalisation as an intrinsically negative phenomenon and certainly see no future in any attempt to go backwards to re-entrench the Westphalian state or try to reindustrialise the rich world economies.  Our problems today truly are global yet we lack global political mechanisms to deal with these.  Ultimately, these struggles to oppose and limit the power of capital must become international and, moreover, they must be democratic if they are to succeed in any worthwhile way.

Environmental Collapse and Reevaluating Growth

Finally, I’d like to address one of the most pressing issues raised by Eric in his critique of my previous article; environmental destruction.   This is perhaps one of the most important indications of our need to adopt a global approach as the environmental disaster posed by climate change is not limited in its effects to any one country or region but rather, poses significant risks for all life on earth.

The ideology of untrammelled growth central to capitalism is profoundly dysfunctional.  The only analogue in nature to an organism that recognises no limits or controls to growth is cancer.  As we all know, the point at which untreated cancer cells cease growing is at the point where the host body dies.  It is an ugly analogy but, the economic system we currently follow is essentially cancerous.  Schumpeter’s “creative destruction” increasingly looks more like simple destruction without any “creation” worth mentioning.

It is necessary that, lacking a global political mechanism able to coordinate such efforts, individual nations do what they can to respond to the environmental crisis but, we must acknowledge that, just as individual responses to the related economic crisis are limited, so too will our very best efforts to address the environmental crisis be.  This is, however, no reason for refraining from the attempt.  What can be done must be done and struggle is the best way to perceive the limits to what can be achieved and the only way to force up past those limits.

What Is To Be Done?

The task for Leftists in the current era is, I would argue, to advance international cooperation and solidarity among ourselves whilst reaching out to our allies.  The movements for change of the future are liable to be networks and loose coalitions cooperating around specific issues rather than the mass parties of the past.  We need to leave our ideological conceits, sectarian preferences and vanguardist fantasies buried in the Twentieth Century where they belong. 

Our goal must, I believe, be to advance new forms of participatory democracy at the local, national and international level and, a major programmatic focus must be economic.  If we are to ever be “free from economics” we must attack economism by offering alternative economic models that subordinate the economy to society and democratic politics.  As much as possible, we need to experiment with practical models rather than attempting to push dry theory which does little more than keep academics in jobs.  People are understandibly skeptical of almost any new idea until they can see for themselves that it works.  The wasteland of failed ideas lurks behind us all and provokes us all to caution and conservatism; the Left needs to work with this cautiousness rather than trying to browbeat people with our “superior understanding”- an unfortunate personality flaw which has left us stereotyped as “out-of-touch, self-righteous elites” by the cunning conservative populists of the Right.

There is no question that the task is daunting and the stakes are extremely high but the global crisis of capitalism is right on top of us, threatening everything we hold sacred and even everything that keeps us alive.  There is a golden opportunity presenting itself, for perhaps the briefest of times, to change direction and lay the foundations for a quantum shift in the way we live on this fragile planet of ours, how we treat each other and how we view ourselves and our societies.  The possibility to really change for the best is tantalisingly tangible yet frustratingly held back by our own limitations and the lack of structures to work through.

I admit that my own answers remain vague and more a matter of principle than detail but these things are always a collective effort.   Already there are countless examples of activists doing what needs to be done and trying to implement change on the ground, perhaps what we need is just to deepen our links with each other and see what can be gleaned from our common experience as we try to forge disparate acts of resistance and creation into a broader strategy for change.  The nature of the times demand that we stretch the limits of our creativity in responding to the needs of our era.

In contrast, it is in just such times as these that the last thing we need is a “Left” that has nothing more to offer than a bleating plea for “decent capitalism” based on a return to some sanitised, nostalgic fantasy of the industrial past.  Such an appallingly stunted vision is worse than no vision at all, and it is in this spirit that I was originally moved to make my previous contribution to the economics debate within the European social-democratic movement.

A Final, Personal Note

I hope this goes some way towards clarifying the perspective from which I approached my previous contribution on the “democratic mixed economy”.  I believe there are several points on which my own views and Eric’s converge or, at least overlap though several points of contention may yet remain, which I believe is a strength rather than a weakness as it is only through discussion that ideas can be refined.  I would be more than happy to discuss these ideas further with Eric or anyone else who is interested.   The most important thing is to discuss and develop the concepts and approaches that can take us forward and my own views are nothing but a work in progress- I am always open to the persuasion of better ideas and more insightful perspectives.  In other words, all (constructive) responses are welcome.

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[1] Polanyi Karl (2001 (1944) The Great Transformation, The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Boston,

                                                 Beacon Press  p. 242